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Clinical trials in neonates: ethical issues 
 
Abstract 
Clinical trials in neonatology often raise complex ethical problems.  
This paper suggests that in tackling these it is useful to identify and 
separate out those elements of the problem that are genuinely ethical 
(e.g. can I enter a child into a trial if I am not in personal equipoise?) 
from those that are empirical (e.g. what is the evidence for a 
treatment's effectiveness?) and those that are formal (e.g. what do 
codes or the law permit?)  The genuinely ethical elements are 
examples of philosophical problems and must be tackled in a way 
appropriate to such problems.  In practice this usually means some 
form of systematic argument.  This is often frustrating to clinicians 
who are more used to the assuredness of empirical research.  The 
paper next examines two ethical problems that arise frequently in 
neonatal trials.  The first is equipoise and the related issue of 
recruiting parents who are not in equipoise because they strongly 
desire that their baby get the active treatment.  We briefly defend the 
recruitment of such "desperate volunteers".  The second is informed 
consent.  We discuss the nature and value of informed consent and 
suggest that clinicians can often obtain worthwhile consent even in 
very difficult trials.  The final section of the paper uses the example of 
clinical trials for brain injury to illustrate the difficulties. 
 
Key words 
Neonatology; clinical trial; ethics; equipoise; consent.
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Clinical trials in neonates: ethical issues 
 
Introduction 
If neonates are to receive the best possible treatment, clinical trials 
involving them must take place.  However, doing such trials raises 
complicated ethical issues.  These issues are not unique to 
neonatology but some of them may be more common or acute than in 
other areas of medicine.  This paper focuses on two issues in 
particular, equipoise and informed consent.  These issues themselves 
arise as many different types of problem in practice.  The paper 
begins, however, with the question, “What is an ethical issue?”  This is 
of importance as sometimes, issues that are not ethical are mistakenly 
thought to be so and vice versa.  Furthermore, once we recognise what 
type of problems are ethical we can also recognise the correct means 
to tackle them. 
 
What is an ethical issue? 
Isaiah Berlin usefully distinguished three types of questions: 
empirical, formal and philosophical.1 Empirical questions are those 
that are, in principle at least, answerable by reference to sensory 
experience: observation, experiment and the like.  Similarly, empirical 
science is that which tackles such questions.  Formal questions are 
answerable by reference to a man-made system, such as 
mathematics, games or law.  Questions such as “What is the square 
root of 9?” or “How does the knight move in chess” are answerable by 
applying the relevant formal system, not by observation of the world.  
Clearly many questions will combine both types.  “How many chairs 
are there in the room?” is empirical and formal.  However, it is 
primarily empirical.   
 
Finally, there are philosophical questions.  These are those that have 
no obvious empirical or formal method for answering them but which 
nonetheless appear to make sense.  They belong academically within 
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the discipline of philosophy.  However, just as the empirical questions 
of medicine impinge on our lives, so do philosophical questions.  Chief 
amongst these belong to the branch of philosophy that concerns itself 
with questions of right and wrong conduct, good and bad character, 
and the like: that is, ethics.  Hence a question such as whether a 
particular neonate, faced with a short life of severe handicap, should 
be given treatment aimed at keeping him alive, is primarily an ethical 
one.  This then gives us a definition of an ethical issue.  It is one in 
which an ethical question or questions will play a large part in its 
resolution.   
 
Berlin’s distinction is useful because it helps us think more clearly 
about the type of problem we face and the appropriate means for 
resolving it.2 Neonatologists, like most clinicians, have a background 
that is primarily in the empirical sciences; their means of resolving 
problems is usually through recourse to evidence.  Where the 
problems faced are primarily empirical this is entirely correct.  In 
deciding whether surfactant is the appropriate treatment for a 
neonate, empirical evidence is the standard to choose.  Where 
clinicians may err is in attempting to resolve, or believing they can 
resolve, ethical issues empirically.   
 
An example may help illustrate this; a paper entitled, “Is 
venepuncture in neonatal research ethical?”3 The researchers do a 
questionnaire study assessing parents’ report of their feelings about 
the test and of doctors’ perception of parents’ feelings.  They conclude 
that “venepuncture in neonates seems to be acceptable to most 
parents and is associated with a favourable risk: benefit ratio …”  
This, however, does not answer the question posed by the paper.  That 
question cannot be answered empirically as it is a 
philosophical/ethical question.  What is required is some notion of 
what would make venepuncture ethical.  In the paper, the authors 
seem to imply something along these lines: venepuncture will be 
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ethical if it accords with guidelines of the British Paediatric 
Association and if it is acceptable to parents (in the sense that it 
doesn’t upset them too much).  However, in order fully to answer the 
question posed by the paper the authors need to state this explicitly 
and, perhaps, to defend it. 
 
How, though, would the authors go about mounting such a defence?  
Here it is useful to return to Berlin’s distinction.  An empirical 
question is answered through observation and experimentation; a 
good answer to such a question is one that is obtained systematically 
and which can be replicated.  A formal question is answered through 
application of the formal system; a good answer is one which can be 
replicated.  A philosophical question is answered through some kind 
of systematic argument.  There are many types of argument; dialectic 
is one example.4 A good answer is one that is convincing (or, more 
precisely, should be convincing to one who is rational).  So, the 
authors would defend their definition of what counts as an ethical 
intervention through some kind of argument attempting to convince 
the rational reader. 
 
For many clinicians, philosophical argument is immensely frustrating.  
Used to the certainty of evidence based medicine, with its gold 
standards, philosophy seems to present answers that only ever hold 
tenuously, until the next, better argument comes along.  It is 
tempting, therefore, to try to answer philosophical questions 
empirically; but this cannot be done.  It is tempting also to try to 
answer them formally.  In ethics, particularly, one might do this by 
recourse to the law or to codes of conduct.  Ultimately, though, the 
success of such an enterprise will depend on whether the law or codes 
themselves have answered the ethical questions well.  For example, 
researchers have criticised the data protection law for preventing 
epidemiological research.  One way of describing their criticism is as a 
philosophical argument: the law places too much value on consent (to 
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the use of data) as opposed to the value of what could be done with 
this data. 
 
Many of the problems we face in clinical trials may be a combination 
of empirical, formal and philosophical questions.  In tackling them we 
should try to be clear about what type of question we face and, 
therefore, the appropriate method for resolving it.  It seems unlikely 
that clinical trials in neonatology face any unique problems.  However, 
there are a number of features of neonatology that result in certain 
problems occurring particularly frequently or acutely.  These features 
include: that neonatology is a relatively new discipline, resulting in a 
need to trial many interventions; the incompetence of the research 
subject, resulting in difficulties relating to proxy informed consent; the 
immensely fragile nature of the research subject, resulting in 
potentially large benefits and harms from experimental interventions 
and, therefore also, difficulties in assessing equipoise; and the fact 
that clinical trials are quite often done in situations of urgency, 
resulting in questions of whether or not informed consent is possible 
and whether a consent waiver should be given. 
 
In the rest of this paper we shall consider some of these issues.  We 
focus on two in particular, although we shall brush against other 
issues in our discussion (such as the desperate volunteer problem).  
The first is equipoise, the second, informed consent.   
 
Equipoise 
As an example, the issue of equipoise arose in setting up the UK 
collaborative trial of extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO).5
At the time it was set up, two studies had been performed the results 
of which, it was argued, might have undermined equipoise.6-8 The 
trial organisers argued, however, that the unconventional design of 
the previous studies undermined their credibility and that, therefore, 
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equipoise remained about ECMO as a treatment for pulmonary 
hypertension: a proper randomised controlled trial (RCT) was justified. 
 
We do not take issue with this conclusion.  However, it is a good 
example from which to illustrate the complexity of equipoise (a 
concept on which there is a vast literature).  At the heart of this 
complexity is the way equipoise combines both empirical and 
philosophical judgement.  Equipoise is not simply a matter of whether 
or not we know that a treatment works or doesn’t work. 
 
Clinical trials are set up to avoid error to a certain degree.  At the end 
of a trial we may typically be able to say that we can conclude that a 
treatment is effective with a certain level of certainty: if we have 
p=0.01 we can say that drawing such a conclusion will be wrong on 
one occasion in a hundred.  This is not the same as saying we know 
with absolute certainty; very little in medicine is known to this degree.  
What is important is that we believe it is certain enough to act upon.  
And it is the link to action that makes equipoise particularly difficult. 
 
When a clinician says he is in equipoise he means he does not know 
whether he should or should not give a certain treatment to his 
patients: an action.  However, deciding whether or not to act is not 
simply a matter of empirical knowledge.  We act on the basis of what 
we know but also of our values.  If someone knows there is a pound 
coin on the road, whether or not she picks it up will be a function of 
how important the money is to her compared to other values, such as 
how important her time is or how important her well-being should 
there be traffic on the road.  When a clinician decides to give a 
treatment it is because she knows it has been shown to be effective (to 
a certain level of certainty) and she values the outcome of palliation or 
treatment.  In most cases this is straightforward and clinicians will 
hardly notice the value judgement running alongside the empirical 
one.   
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The times when it is not straightforward are where decision-makers 
disagree either over the empirical or the value judgement.  Our 
concern here is with the latter.  A good example is the judgement of 
whether or not to treat very premature infants.  The disagreement 
between clinicians is not usually empirical: they all know the relevant 
empirical evidence.  Rather it is ethical, of values: they disagree over 
whether the small chance of survival, and the quality of life of those 
who do survive, is worthwhile both in terms of resources and in terms 
of the best interest of the infant itself. 
 
In that equipoise concerns a decision to act, to give a treatment, it 
follows that whether or not one is in equipoise regarding treatments 
will also be a function of values.  A clinician may not share the 
equipoise of her peers not because she disagrees about the empirical 
evidence but because her values differ from theirs.  She may, for 
example, think that a side-effect is particularly undesirable and that a 
new treatment which risks it should be avoided.   
 
In setting up clinical trials, therefore, the question is not simply 
whether there is equipoise but whose equipoise should matter.  In 
many trials this is not a problem as all relevant parties are either in 
equipoise or are, at least, indifferent between treatment arms in a 
trial.  This will be the case most commonly when there is not too 
much at stake, as in some feeding trials.  Controversy is more likely 
where the trial is into an intervention that is a potential treatment for 
a dangerous or debilitating condition for which current treatment is 
unsatisfactory, such as perinatal asphyxia.  Here, whilst there may be 
equipoise across the clinical community, it may be that parents do not 
share it.  Qualitative research involving trials in just such situations 
(the ECMO and TOBY studies)9;10 found that many parents who gave 
consent for their neonate to take part in such studies were far from 
indifferent between treatment arms; they wanted their child to receive 
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the new treatment.  Why should clinicians’ equipoise, and therefore 
values, take precedence over parents’ in this situation?   
 
An alternative way of phrasing this question is to ask whether, in 
order for it to be ethical to set up and run a clinical trial, equipoise 
must obtain amongst all relevant participants, clinicians and parents.  
Such a stipulation would result in it being impossible to run 
randomised trials of treatments for the most debilitating and 
dangerous conditions.  One would, instead, have to run non-
randomised trials using, say, historical controls.  As a result, one 
might argue, the areas most in need of strong evidence for treatments 
would have only weak evidence.  However, where one runs 
randomised trials one runs into the problem of desperate volunteers.  
These are parents who agree to take part in the randomised trial only 
because it offers them a 50/50 chance of getting their child the 
treatment they want, rather than no chance at all outside the trial.   
 
This desperate volunteer problem will perhaps be fairly common in 
neonatology.  A recent paper attempts to defend the use of clinicians’ 
equipoise in the setting up of trials and the recruitment of desperate 
volunteers.11 This uses the notion of collective clinical equipoise 
based on the decisions of the Trial Steering Committee (TSC) and the 
Data Monitoring and Ethics Committee (DMEC).  The paper argues 
that the reason these committees’ notion of equipoise, and the related 
values, should take precedence, is because they reflect widely held 
social values.  Given the complex nature of equipoise and the reams 
written on the subject this paper is unlikely to be the last word, 
however. 
 
Informed consent 
We turn now to informed consent.  In any discussion of this topic it is 
useful to have three questions in the back of one’s mind: 
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What is informed consent? 
Why does it matter? 
How much does it matter? 
 
These are philosophical/ethical questions.  The first is about the 
nature of informed consent, the second and third are about its value.  
Typically one finds that controversies about informed consent may 
involve some confusion between the two areas.  Take the question of 
whether or not a thirteen-year-old girl can consent to the pill.  
Disputants may argue that such a girl is unlikely to have the maturity 
to make such a decision (a dispute about the nature of consent); or 
they may argue that the girl’s decision should not be allowed to 
override her parents’ views (a dispute about the value of consent).  
And often the argument will confuse the two areas; it pays to keep 
them separate.  Using the nature/value framework, let us turn to the 
topic of informed consent in relation to clinical trials in neonatology. 
 
Nature of informed consent 
The most obvious point is that the research subject can never consent 
him or herself; the parents must do that.  In order for the parental 
consent to be ethically sound and/or legally valid it should probably 
meet the standards applied to all other consent.12 In other words, it 
should meet various criteria.  First, those giving consent should be 
competent to do so; second, those giving consent should have 
adequate information and understand that information; and, finally, 
those giving consent should do so voluntarily, without coercion.   
 
The main concern in neonatology has been that consent to clinical 
trials falls short of one or more of those criteria.  This is particularly 
so in trials on very ill neonates and where the time available in which 
to consent is short.  Such circumstances could undermine all the 
criteria.  In relation to competence, the mother may have had a 
traumatic birth involving drugs that render her unable to think 
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clearly; she may even be unconscious.  The father may be emotionally 
overwhelmed by the circumstances.  In relation to information and 
understanding, parents may struggle to understand concepts such as 
randomization, particularly in the short time available.  In relation to 
voluntariness, parents may feel pressured to consent to research 
studies knowing that the clinicians have their child’s life in their 
hands.  Furthermore, the consent of desperate volunteers can hardly 
be said to be voluntary. 
 
At least two studies have suggested that at least some of these 
problems do eventuate in practice.13;14 There is also evidence that 
parents who give consent for a trial in the early neonatal period later 
forget having done so.15 One response of neonatologists has been to 
look to ways of improving the consent process, particularly in urgent 
and emergency trials.  An example of this is the TOBY trial, assessing 
the effectiveness of whole-body cooling in the treatment of neonatal 
asphyxia.  This is precisely the sort of trial where one might expect 
consent to be compromised: the treatment is for a life-threatening 
condition; the parents are usually unaware of any problem pre-
natally; the trial is randomized; and the time available in which to 
decide about trial entry is short.   
 
Aware of these problems, the TOBY TSC took pains to develop what it 
hoped would be an effective means of obtaining informed consent.  
This has two elements.  The first is clinician training in the process of 
obtaining consent for the TOBY study, including role-play.  The 
second is continuous consent: parents are given initial information 
about the trial, then further information if they are interested; finally, 
while the baby is getting the trial treatment, a clinician goes through 
the study with them again, checking understanding and ensuring they 
are happy for the trial to continue.  A recent qualitative study of 
parents who gave consent to this trial suggests that these measures 
have had a good effect.9
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Perhaps, then, clinicians should not be too hasty in believing it is 
impossible to get informed consent to some neonatal trials.  They 
should also beware the “counsel of perfection”.  Informed consent 
should not be viewed as an ideal to which we aspire but which we can 
never obtain.  Every decision in life is made against the backdrop of 
human frailties and uncertainty.  There is no reason to aspire for to a 
standard of consent that is above this.  Nonetheless, there may be 
situations in which it is impossible to achieve informed consent: the 
mother is unconscious and the father absent; there is extremely 
limited time available; the parents both have a learning disability.  
There may also be situations in which obtaining informed consent 
comes at a great cost.  This may be in time and effort, as in 
epidemiological studies where it is now difficult to trace the parents to 
ask for consent.  Or it may be emotional cost to the parents.  In both 
ECMO and TOBY, there was evidence from qualitative studies that 
parents who gave consent and whose babies were then randomized to 
receive the control treatment were disappointed, sometimes bitterly.  
Are there times when we should forego consent?  Answering this 
question requires that we look at the value of informed consent. 
 
Value of informed consent 
In considering the value of informed consent we need to think about 
what it is for.  The standard reason is that its purpose is to respect 
people’s autonomy.  As Dworkin puts it:16 
“All discussions of the nature of informed consent and its rationale 
refer to patient (or subject) autonomy” (p.5) 
 
However, this sits a little awkwardly in neonatology.  The term 
“autonomy” means, literally, “self-rule”.  Clearly the neonate cannot 
self-rule; and the decisions of the parents on its behalf are, to borrow 
Kant’s term, heteronomous.  What, then, is the role of their consent?   
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To answer this question is to call into question Dworkin’s suggestion.  
Informed consent as a doctrine in medical research did not originate 
primarily as a method to safeguard autonomy; it was, rather, to 
safeguard well-being.  Both the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki 
Declaration emphasise the consent of research subjects/participants.  
Their origin was in the exposure of the horrific research performed in 
Nazi Germany.17-19 The thought is that people do not usually put 
themselves into trials that expose them to unreasonable risk and 
harm.   
 
This, then, may be one of the purposes of proxy parental consent on 
behalf of neonates; to safeguard them from harm.  However, in this 
role it may be of fairly limited use.  Clearly, parents will wish to 
safeguard their neonates.  However, so do Research Ethics 
Committees, TSCs and DMECs as well as clinicians themselves.  It is 
unlikely that parental consent contributes much to the protection of 
the neonate in clinical trials.  So perhaps it has another role, one that 
we might express in terms of social recognition of the importance of 
families and parents.  Our society is organised in such a way that 
children are brought up primarily within families.  Parents take on the 
main responsibility and are required to make decisions on their 
behalf.  They may not do so perfectly; but our respect for that system 
manifests itself in a respect for parental decision-making albeit 
imperfect.   
 
This seems to give us a better handle on why parents should be asked 
their permission for neonates to be entered into clinical trials.  If it is 
correct it helps us also in relation to what to do about consent that is 
of poor quality.  For, faced with the difficulty of getting a reasonable 
quality of informed consent in some studies, some have argued we 
should waive the requirement for it.20 Perhaps, though, if we think in 
terms of obtaining the best consent possible in the circumstances, 
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rather than informed consent of the type one would hope for in usual 
circumstances, we would be less concerned.  If the role of parental 
consent is primarily to acknowledge the parental role then “best 
possible consent” does this job well enough. 
 
We are still left, though, with difficult cases and difficult choices.  
Manning’s point is not simply that getting informed consent to 
emergency neonatal research is difficult (or impossible); it is also that 
it is costly.  It will inevitably take some time.  One might test an 
intervention that is effective but only if performed very quickly.  A 
requirement for consent of any kind might result in our never knowing 
this.  Another cost is in the distress caused to parents. 
 
It is perhaps possible to deal with Manning’s point about distress to 
parents.  The research available thus far suggests that even though 
parents recognise the difficulty and emotional pain caused through 
involvement in decisions about research and treatment, they do not 
wish to be excluded.15;21 Similarly, the argument that Zelen 
randomization be used to protect the parents whose babies are 
randomized to the control group22 is undermined by research 
suggesting that these are precisely the parents who would find such 
randomization objectionable.23 This is evidence of the importance of 
the parental role from parents’ own perspectives.   
 
Manning’s problem of the cost to emergency neonatal research itself of 
the consent requirement is not so easily dismissed.  The argument 
here has shown why parental consent is very important, why it should 
not be put lightly to one side.  However, is it so important that some 
research cannot be done, that some important evidence about effective 
treatment cannot be unearthed?  Or, rather, should we view parental 
consent as important but defeasible?   
 
What can we do? 
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However, this suggestion of defeasibility runs into problems when one 
considers the example of clinical trials and the treatment of brain 
injury.  The aetiology of brain injury in human newborns is 
multifactorial and hypoxic-ischemic insults, genetic factors of 
susceptibility, growth factor deficiency, oxidative stress, maternal 
stress and infection, cytokines, have all been implicated in the 
pathophysiology of brain lesions associated with cerebral palsy.24 The 
links between infection, cytokines and neurotrophins are complex and 
can have deleterious effects. 
 
Some types of neuroprotective agents, such as NMDA receptors 
antagonists, are precluded because of a potential massive apoptotic 
cell death following the intervention. 25 In contrast, blockade of alpha-
3-amino-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazole propionic acid (AMPA) and 
kainate receptors by drugs such as Topiramate or AMPA antagonists 
may not produce such deleterious effects on neuronal survival and 
neuroprotective effects were observed.26 Positive allosteric modulators 
of AMPA receptors (S 18986) have been shown to be neuroprotective 
in neonatal animal models, by causing release of neurotrophins such 
as brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF).27 The role of cytokines, 
induced by infection, is predominantly deleterious in extending 
neuronal damage and a useful reduction of neurological deficit with 
tianeptine was shown to block the deleterious effects of inflammatory 
cytokines on neonatal excitotoxic lesions in a mouse model.28 
Tianeptine is a well-tolerated antidepressant drug used in human 
adolescents and adults. Trophic factors, such as IGF-1 and BDNF, 
which have anti-apoptotic properties, can prevent asphyxic or 
excitotoxic neuronal death in animal models of perinatal damage.  
 
However, these drugs are experimental, or not used for neonates, and 
so there is great difficulty involved in testing drugs in neonates and 
children, which urgently requires an open and in-depth debate.25 
This is particularly the case as longitudinal development profiles have 
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been mapped out for brain maturation, allowing clear definition of 
where children may lie in their developmental trajectories.29 While it is 
accepted that there is desperate need in some cases there is also great 
difficulty in obtaining potentially useful drugs for trials. 
 
For financial and ethical reasons, the pharmaceutical industry has 
difficulties in making substantial investments in this area. Drugs may 
leave markers in development which are not necessarily due to the 
drug, but secondary to a combination of the modified lesion and the 
development stage when the drug was administered; such markers 
may appear in patient cohorts, leaving the doubt that the effects were 
due to the drug. Adolescents might therefore sue drug makers, where 
their lives have been saved, but where such developmental markers 
might, rightly or wrongly, point to the action of the drug. Thus the 
pharmaceutical industry has difficulties in supporting this difficult 
area. Society must have some willingness to accept benefit associated 
with risk.  It follows that parental consent has a further role: to 
protect those conducting clinical trials from litigation.  Furthermore, 
parental consent must be very strongly worded, even in difficult 
situations. 
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Clinical practice points 
• When tackling ethical problems it is useful to distinguish 
between empirical, formal and philosophical elements of the 
problem. 
 
• The philosophical elements must be tackled using techniques 
appropriate, such as systematic argument. 
 
• One cannot answer philosophical questions empirically; this 
lack of empirical assuredness can be frustrating for clinicians. 
 
• In neonatal randomised trials, clinicians sometimes recruit 
parents who are not in equipoise between the different 
treatment arms; they are desperate volunteers.  Such 
recruitment is an ethical problem but may be defensible 
provided there is equipoise in the clinical community. 
 
• Circumstances can make it difficult to obtain good quality 
informed consent to neonatal trials.  This problem can be 
reduced to some extent through strategies such as continuous 
consent.   
 
• Clinicians should avoid a "counsel of perfection" - obtaining the 
best consent in the circumstances is often good enough. 
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Research agenda 
• Research into ethical issues will involve different methodologies 
from standard empirical research.  Some empirical work is 
usually helpful but at some point it is always necessary to 
undertake philosophical work. 
 
Clinical trials in neonates: ethical issues 14/07/2007   
Peter Allmark & Michael Spedding 
 19
Reference List 
 
(1)  Berlin I. Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press; 1969. 
 (2)  Allmark P. Can the study of ethics enhance nursing practice? 
Journal of Advanced Nursing 2005; 51(6):618-624. 
 (3)  Shah VS, Al-Khannan M, Quinn MW, Tripp JH. Is venepuncture 
in neonatal research ethical?... reprinted from Archives of 
Disease in Childhood, 1997 Archives of Disease in Childhood, 
BMJ Publishing Group. Neonatal Intensive Care 1998 May-Jun; 
11(3):28-30. 
 (4)  Allmark P. An argument for the use of Aristotelian method in 
bioethics. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2006; 9(1):69-
79. 
 (5)  Field D, Davis C, Elbourne D, Grant A, Johnson A, Macrae D. 
UK collaborative randomised trial of neonatal extracorporeal 
membrane oxygenation. Lancet 1996; 348(9020):75-82. 
 (6)  Lantos JD. Was the UK collaborative ECMO trial ethical? 
Paediatric and Perinatal Epidemiology 1997; 11(3):264-268. 
 (7)  Orourke PP, Crone RK, Vacanti JP, Ware JH, Lillehei CW, Parad 
RB et al. Extracorporeal Membrane-Oxygenation and 
Conventional Medical Therapy in Neonates with Persistent 
Pulmonary-Hypertension of the Newborn - A Prospective 
Randomized Study. Pediatrics 1989; 84(6):957-963. 
 (8)  Bartlett RH, Roloff DW, Cornell RG, Andrews AF, Dillon PW, 
Zwischenberger JB. Extracorporeal-Circulation in Neonatal 
Respiratory-Failure - A Prospective Randomized Study. 
Pediatrics 1985; 76(4):479-487. 
Clinical trials in neonates: ethical issues 14/07/2007   
Peter Allmark & Michael Spedding 
 20
(9)  Allmark P, Mason S. Improving the quality of consent to 
randomised controlled trials using continuous consent and 
clinician training in the consent process.  J Med Ethics 2006; In 
press. 
 (10)  Snowdon C, Garcia J, Elbourne D. Making sense of 
randomization; Responses of parents of critically ill babies to 
random allocation of treatment in a clinical trial. Social Science 
& Medicine 1997; 45(9):1337-1355. 
 (11)  Allmark P, Mason S. Should desperate volunteers be included in 
randomised controlled trials? J Med Ethics 2006; Forthcoming. 
 (12)  Beauchamp T, Faden R. A history and theory of informed 
consent. New York: Oxford University Press; 1986. 
 (13)  Snowdon C, Garcia J, Elbourne D. Making sense of 
randomization; Responses of parents of critically ill babies to 
random allocation of treatment in a clinical trial. Social Science 
& Medicine 1997; 45(9):1337-1355. 
 (14)  Mason SA, Allmark PJ. Obtaining informed consent to neonatal 
randomised controlled trials: interviews with parents and 
clinicians in the Euricon study. Lancet 2000; 356(9247):2045-
2051. 
 (15)  Stenson BJ, Becher JC, McIntosh N. Neonatal research: the 
parental perspective. Archives of Disease in Childhood 2004; 
89(4):F321-F323. 
 (16)  Dworkin G. The Theory and Practice of Autonomy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1988. 
 (17)  Weindling P. Human guinea pigs and the ethics of 
experimentation: The BMJ's correspondent at the Nuremberg 
Clinical trials in neonates: ethical issues 14/07/2007   
Peter Allmark & Michael Spedding 
 21
medical trial. British Medical Journal 1996; 313(7070):1467-
1470. 
 (18)  BMJ. The Nuremberg Code. British Medical Journal 1996; 
313:1448. 
 (19)  World Medical Association. Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical 
Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects 5th 
Revision. WMA [ 2000  [cited 2006 Mar. 15]; Available from: 
URL:http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm
(20)  Manning DJ. Presumed consent in emergency neonatal 
research. Journal of Medical Ethics 26(4):249-53, 2000. 
 (21)  Allmark P, Mason S. Improving the quality of consent to 
randomised controlled trials by using continuous consent and 
clinician training in the consent process. J Med Ethics 2006; 
32(8):439-443. 
 (22)  Allmark P. Should Zelen pre-randomised consent designs be 
used in some neonatal trials? Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 
25(4):325-329. 
 (23)  Snowdon C, Elbourne D, Garcia J. Zelen randomization: 
Attitudes of parents participating in a neonatal clinical trial. 
Controlled Clinical Trials 1999; 20(2):149-171. 
 (24)  Zupan V, Gonzalez P, Lacaze-Masmonteil T, Boithias C, d'Allest 
AM, Dehan M et al. Periventricular leukomalacia: risk factors 
revisited. Dev Med Child Neurol 1996; 38(12):1061-1067. 
 (25)  Gressens P, Spedding M. Strategies for neuroprotection in the 
newborn. Drug Discovery Today: Therapeutic Strategies 2004; 
1(1):77-82. 
Clinical trials in neonates: ethical issues 14/07/2007   
Peter Allmark & Michael Spedding 
 22
(26)  Gressens P, Spedding M, Gigler G, Kertesz S, Villa P, Medja F et 
al. The effects of AMPA receptor antagonists in models of stroke 
and neurodegeneration. Eur J Pharmacol 2005; 519(1-2):58-67. 
 (27)  Dicou E, Rangon CM, Guimiot F, Spedding M, Gressens P. 
Positive allosteric modulators of AMPA receptors are 
neuroprotective against lesions induced by an NMDA agonist in 
neonatal mouse brain. Brain Res 2003; 970(1-2):221-225. 
 (28)  Plaisant F, Dommergues MA, Spedding M, Cecchelli R, Brillault 
J, Kato G et al. Neuroprotective properties of tianeptine: 
interactions with cytokines. Neuropharmacology 2003; 
44(6):801-809. 
 (29)  Toga AW, Thompson PM, Sowell ER. Mapping brain maturation. 
Trends Neurosci 2006; 29(3):148-159. 
 
